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Abstract
Many researchers from a variety of fields including computer science, network science and mathematics
have focused on how to contain the outbreaks of Internet misinformation that threaten social systems and
undermine societal health. Most research on this topic treats the connections among individuals as static,
but these connections change in time, and thus social networks are also temporal networks. Currently there
is no theoretical approach to the problem of containing misinformation outbreaks in temporal networks.
We thus propose a misinformation spreading model for temporal networks and describe it using a new
theoretical approach. We propose a heuristic-containing (HC) strategy based on optimizing final outbreak
size that outperforms simplified strategies such as those that are random-containing (RC) and targeted-
containing (TC). We verify the effectiveness of our HC strategy on both artificial and real-world networks
by performing extensive numerical simulations and theoretical analyses. We find that the HC strategy
greatly increases the outbreak threshold and decreases the final outbreak threshold.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many communications platforms, e.g., Twitter, Facebook, email, WhatsApp, and mobile phones,
allow numerous ways of sharing information [1–6]. One task for researchers is developing ways to
distinguish between true and false information, i.e., between “news” and “fake news” [7]. This task
is important because access to true information is essential in the process of intelligent decision-
making [8–10]. For example, when the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) spread across
Guangzhou, China in 2003, the Chinese Southern Weekly published a newspaper article entitled
“There is a Fatal Flu in Guangzhou.” This information was forwarded over 126 million times by
TV news and in other newspapers [11, 12]. Individuals receiving this true information could adopt
simple, effective protective measures against being infected (e.g., by staying at home, washing
hands, or wearing masks). Misinformation, on the other hand, encourages irrational behavior and
reckless decision-making, and its spread can undermine societal well-being and sway the outcome
of elections [13–16]. Bovet and Makse [17] analyzed 171 million tweets sent during the five
months prior to the 2016 US presidential election and found that misinformation strongly affected
the outcome of that election.
To contain the spread of misinformation we must understand the dynamic information spread-
ing mechanisms that facilitate it [18–28]. Vosoughi et al. [1] examined true and fake informa-
tion on Twitter from 2006 to 2017 and found that misinformation spreads more quickly than true
information. Using the spreading mechanisms common in real-data analysis, researchers have
proposed several mathematical models to describe the spreading dynamics of true and fake in-
formation [29–34]. Moreno et al. [29] developed mean-field equations to describe the spread of
classical misinformation on static scale-free networks that enables a theoretical study not requiring
extensive numerical simulations. Borge-Holthoefer and Moreno [35] found that although there are
no influential spreaders in the classical misinformation model presented in Ref. [29], nodes with
high k-cores and ranking values are more likely to be the influential spreaders of true information
and also of infectious diseases [36–40]. When we include the burst behavior of individuals in the
misinformation model, hubs emerge as influential nodes [41]. Using real-world data, researchers
found that social networks evolve with time, and thus evolving temporal networks more accurately
represent the topology of real-world networks than static networks [42–52].
Researchers have found that the temporal nature of networks strongly affect their spreading dy-
namics. Perra et al. [53] found that in susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) epidemic spreading a
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temporal network behavior suppresses the spreading more effectively than a static integrated net-
work. Researchers have also found that the SIS and susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) models
on temporal networks exhibit the same outbreak threshold [54–56]. Nadini et al. [49] found that
tightly connected clusters in temporal networks inhibit SIR processes, but accelerate SIS spread-
ing. Pozzana et al. found that when node attractiveness—its role as a preferential target for
interactions—in temporal networks is heterogeneous, the contagion process is altered [57]. Kar-
sai et al. [58] found that strong ties between individuals strongly inhibit the classical spreading
dynamics of misinformation.
Several strategies for containing the spread of misinformation in temporal networks have been
proposed [59–62]. Liu et al. [60] examined epidemic spreading on activity driven temporal net-
works and developed mean-field based theoretical approaches for three different control strategies,
i.e., random, targeted, and egocentric. The egocentric strategy is most effective. It immunizes a
randomly selected neighbor of a node in the observation window. Other effective approaches
using extensive numerical simulations have been proposed [63–65]. For example, Holme and Lil-
jeros [63] take into consideration the time variation of nodes and edges and propose a strategy for
containing the outbreak of an epidemic based on the birth and death of links.
Because there is still no theoretical approach to containing the spread of misinformation in tem-
poral networks, we here systematically examine its spread in activity-driven networks. The rest of
the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the misinformation spreading dynamics on
temporal networks and develops a theory to describe the spreading dynamics. Section IV proposes
three containment strategies. Section V describes the results of our extensive numerical stochastic
simulations, which show that our suggested theory agrees with the numerical simulations. Sec-
tion IV presents our conclusions.
II. MISINFORMATION SPREADING IN TEMPORAL NETWORKS
We here introduce our model for the spreading dynamics of misinformation in temporal networks.
A. Mathematical descriptions for temporal networks
The widely used approaches mathematically describing temporal networks tend to be either event-
based or snapshot representations [47]. The event-based representation approach describes de-
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scribes temporal networks using ordered events {ui, vi, ti,∆ti; i = 1, 2, · · · }, where node ui and
vi are connected at time ti in the time period ∆ti. The snapshot approach describes temporal net-
works using a discrete sequence of static networks G = {G(1),G(2), · · · ,G(tmax)}, where G(t)
is the snapshot network at time t, and tmax is the number of snapshots of the temporal network.
Each snapshot network G(t), contains N nodes, where N is fixed, and Mt edges. Thus the av-
erage temporal degree of snapshot network G(t) is 〈kt〉 = 2Mt/N . Using the adjacency matrix,
the temporal network is A = {A(1),A(2), · · · ,A(tmax)}, where A(t) is the adjacency matrix of
network G(t).
We here adopt the snapshot approach to describe temporal networks. As the meaning of the
adjacency matrix in static networks, Auv(t) = 1 when nodes u and v are connected at time t,
otherwise, Auv(t) = 0. Thus the degree ku(t) of node u at time t is ku(t) =
∑N
v=1Auv(t)
for undirected temporal networks. The average degree of node u in the temporal network G is
〈ku(t)〉 =
1
tmax
∑tmax
t=1 ku(t). Knowing the adjacency matrix A we obtain the eigenvalues of A.
Here Λ1(A) Λ2(A), · · · , and ΛN(A) are the eigenvalues of A in decreasing order. The spectral
radius is thus Λ1(A), which quantifies the threshold outbreak of epidemics in temporal networks.
B. Activity-driven networks
We use the classical activity-driven network [53] to model a temporal network with N nodes. We
build the activity-driven network using the following steps.
1. We assign to each node i an activity potential value xi according to a given probability
density distribution f(x). The activity of node i is ai = ηxi, where η is a rescaling factor,
i.e., at each time step, node i is active with probability ai. The higher the value of η, the
higher the average degree of the temporal network. The higher the value of ai, the higher
the degree of node i. We assume that f(x) follows a power-law function, i.e., f(x) ∼
x−γ , where γ is the potential exponent. We make this assumption in order to generate
a heterogeneous degree distribution temporal network. After further calculations we find
f(x) = γ−1
ǫ1−γ
x−γ , 〈kt〉 = 2m〈a〉, and 〈a〉 = η〈x〉, where 〈x〉 =
∫∞
ǫ
xf(x)dx, and ǫ is
the minimum value of the activity potential xi. Each active node has m edges, and each
edge randomly links to a network node. An edge connects the same pair of nodes with
probabilitym/N . Note that in the thermodynamic limit of a sparse temporal network, there
are no multiple edges between nodes and non-local loops
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2. At the end of time step t, we delete all edges in network G(t).
3. We repeat steps (2) and (3) until tmax in order to generate temporal network G.
C. Misinformation spreading model
We use an ignorant-spreader-refractory model to describe the spreading dynamics of misinforma-
tion [29]. Here nodes are classified as either ignorant, spreader, or refractory. Ignorant nodes are
unaware that the information is false but are susceptible to adopting it. Spreader nodes are aware
that the information is false and are willing to transmit it to ignorant nodes. Refractory nodes
receive the misinformation but do not spread it. The misinformation spreading dynamics on tem-
poral networks evolves as follows. We first randomly select a small fraction ρ0 of spreader nodes
to be seeds in network G(t0), where 1 ≤ t0 ≤ tmax. We designate the remaining 1 − ρ0 nodes
to be ignorant. At time step t each spreader i transmits with probability λ the misinformation to
ignorant neighbors in network G(t). In addition, each spreader i becomes a refractory node with a
probability
µi(t) = 1− (1− µ)
n(t), (1)
where µ is the intrinsic recovery probability, and n(t) is the number of nodes in the spreader and
refractory states of node i. The dynamics evolve until there are no spreader nodes. Note that
when t reaches tmax, the misinformation spreads on G(1) in the next time step. Figure 1 shows
misinformation spreading on a temporal network.
III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
We here develop a generalized discrete Markovian approach to describe the misinformation
spreading dynamics on temporal networks [54]. We denote Ii(t), Si(t), and Ri(t) to be the
fraction of nodes in the ignorant, spreader, and refractory states, respectively, at time t. Because a
node can only be in one of the three states, Ii(t) + Si(t) +Ri(t) = 1.
An ignorant node i, becomes a spreader with probability pi (t) at time t, where
pi (t) = 1−
∏
j
[1− λAij (t) Ij (t)]. (2)
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FIG. 1. Illustration of misinformation spreading on temporal networks.
Here
∏
j [1− λAij (t) Ij (t)] is the probability that node i has not received any misinformation
from neighbors at time t in G(t). At time step t+ 1, node i remains ignorant with a probability
Ii(t+ 1) = Ii(t)− Ii(t)pi(t). (3)
The decrease of Ii(t) is equal to the increase of Si(t), because an ignorant node will become a
spreader when it obtains the information from neighbors in state S. In addition, spreader i becomes
refractory with a probability µi(t) = 1−(1−µ)
1+
∑N
j=1Aij(t)[Ij(t)+Rj (t)]. Thus the evolution of node
i in the spreader state is
Si(t+ 1) = Si(t) + Ii(t)pi(t)− µi(t)Si(t). (4)
The evolution of node i in the refractory state is
Ri(t + 1) = Ri(t) + µi(t)Si(t). (5)
Using Eqs. (3)-(5), we obtain the fraction of nodes at time t in each state,
H(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Hi(t), (6)
whereH ∈ {I, S, R}. Note that in the steady state there are no spreader nodes, only refractory and
stifler nodes. The fraction of nodes that receive the misinformation in the final state isR(∞) = R.
Here R is the order parameter of a continuous phase transition with λ. If the misinformation
7
transmission probability λ is larger than the critical threshold, i.e., λ > λc, the size of the global
misinformation is of the order of the system size. Otherwise, the global misinformation R = 0
for λ ≤ λc is in the thermodynamic limit. At shorter times, a vanishingly small fraction of nodes
receive the misinformation, i.e., Si (t) ≈ 0 and Ri (t) = 1 − Si (t) − Ii (t) ≈ 0. The recovery
probability in Eq. (1) of a spreader node i is µi (t) ≈ µ, since node imust connect to a spreader that
supplies the misinformation, and there is a low probability that it will connect to other spreader or
refractory neighbors. Thus Eq. (4) can be rewritten
Si(t + 1) ≈
N∑
j=1
[(1− µ) + λAij(t)δij]Sj(t), (7)
where δij is the Kronecker delta function, i.e., δij = 1 if i = j, and zero otherwise. We define the
transmission tensorM to be
M
tt′
ij = δ
t,t′+1[(1− µ)δij + λAij(t)]. (8)
We mask the tensorial origin of the space through the map (i, t) → α = Nt + i, where 1 ≤ α ≤
N tmax. ThusM can be rewritten
M =


0 1− µ+ λA(1) 0 · · · 0
0 0 1− µ+ λA(2) · · · 0
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 1− µ+ λA(tmax − 1)
1− µ+ λA(tmax) 0 0 · · · 0


.
(9)
Inserting Eq. (9) into (7), we have
Ŝ(τ) = MŜ(τ − 1), (10)
where Ŝ(τ) is the probability that a node is in the spreader state at each time step t during
[τtmax, (τ + 1)tmax]. Here Ŝ(τ) increases exponentially if the largest eigenvalue of M, denoted
Λ1, is larger than 1. Thus the misinformation spreads, and the threshold condition is [54]
Λ1(M) = 1, (11)
In an unweighted undirected network G, the largest eigenvalue Λ1(M) ofM is
Λ1(M) = Λ1(P
1/tmax), (12)
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where
P =
tmax∑
t=1
(1− µ+ λA(t)). (13)
IV. MISINFORMATION CONTAINING STRATEGIES
Because misinformation spreading on social networks can induce social instability, threaten po-
litical security, and endanger the economy, we propose three strategies—random, targeted, and
heuristic—for containing the spread of misinformation in temporal networks using a given frac-
tion of containing nodes f . We first immunize a fraction of f nodes using a static containment
strategy. The misinformation then spreads on the residual temporal network. If node i is “im-
munized,” it cannot be infected (transmit) by the misinformation received from neighbors (the
misinformation to neighbors). Mathematically the immunized node set is V , and the number of
immunized nodes equals the number of elements in V , i.e., |V| = ⌈f N⌉. We set vi = 1 if node i
is immunized, otherwise vi = 0. After immunization, Eqs. (2)–(4) can be written
pi (t) = 1−
∏
j
[1− λ(1− vj)Aij (t) Ij (t)], (14)
Ii(t+ 1) = Ii(t)− Ii(t)(1− vi)pi(t), (15)
and
Si(t + 1) = Si(t) + Ii(t)(1− vi)pi(t)− µi(t)Si(t), (16)
respectively. In an effective containing strategy the misinformation spreading dynamics is sup-
pressed for a given fixed fraction f of immunized nodes, i.e., the objective function is
min
V
lim
t→∞
1
N
∑
i
Ri(t), (17)
where the constraint conditions are Eqs. (15)–(16) and Vi ∈ {0, 1}, Si (t) ∈ [0, 1], Ii (t) ∈ [0, 1],
and Ri (t) ∈ [0, 1]. Because the problem is NP-hard, finding an accurate solution for large-
scale temporal networks and a finite immunization size f is difficult. To address this problem we
propose three containment strategies.
• Strategy I: Random containment (RC). The most used strategy for containing the spread of
misinformation is randomly immunizing a fraction of f nodes [66].
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• Strategy II: Targeted containment (TC). Another intuitive way is to immunize the nodes
with highest average degree 〈k〉 in the temporal network G. Specifically, we first compute
the average degree of each node i as 〈ki〉 =
1
tmax
∑tmax
t=1
∑N
j=1Aij(t). We then rank all nodes
in descending order in the vectorW according to the average degree of each node. Finally
we immunize the top ⌈fN⌉ nodes ofW .
• Strategy III: Heuristic containment (HC). Using the TC, we apply an HC strategy. Because
TC is much better than RC, we perform the HC strategy by replacing the immunization
nodes. When the repeat time is very large, the immunized nodes reach an optimal value.
(i): We initialize a vector W according to the descending order of the average degree of nodes.
The first ⌈f N⌉ nodes of W are immunized, the final misinformation outbreak size is Ro,
andW0 is denoted a set. The remaining nodesW1 = W\W0 are denoted a set.
(ii): We randomly select nodes in W0 and W1, denoted v0 and v1, respectively. We switch their
order in vectorW and denote the new vectorWn. We immunize the first ⌈f N⌉ nodesWn
and compute the final misinformation outbreak size Rn.
(iii): When Rn > Ro, we update vectorW , i.e.,W →Wn. Otherwise, there is no change.
(iv): We repeat steps (ii) and (iii) until 1
ts
∑ts
i=1 |W−Wn| < ǫ
′. In the simulations we set ts = 100
and ǫ′ = N−1.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
For the activity-driven network, we set N = 103, tmax = 20, η = 10, m = 50, γ = 2.1, and
ǫ = 10−3. For real-world networks, we use the data collected by the Sociopatterns group [? ],
which records the interactions among the participants at a conference. The time resolution of the
signal is 20 sec. Because the temporal network is sparse, it is difficult for the information to spread
in the original network. We thus aggregate the temporal network using four windows, w = 30min,
60min, 120min, and 240min. We average all simulation results more than 1000 times.
We use variability to locate the numerical network-sized dependent outbreak threshold [67, 68],
χ =
(〈R2〉 − 〈R〉2)1/2
〈R〉
, (18)
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FIG. 2. Misinformation spreading on activity-driven temporal networks. (a) The final misinformation out-
break size R, and the numerical variability χ versus the transmission probability λ with different values of
recovery probability µ. In (a), the symbols are the numerical simulation results, and lines are the theoretical
predictions.
where R is the relative size of misinformation spreading at the steady state. At the outbreak
threshold λc, χ exhibits a peak. When λ ≤ λc, the global misinformation does not break out, but
when λ > λc the global misinformation does break out.
Figure 2 shows the misinformation spreading on activity-driven networks. Note that the final
misinformation outbreak size R increases with λ. The larger the recovery probability µ, the lower
the values of R because spreader nodes are less likely to transmit the misinformation to stifler
neighbors [see Fig. 2(a)]. Note that our theoretical and numerical predictions of the final misin-
formation outbreak size R agree. Figure 2(b) shows the variability χ as a function of λ. There
is a peak at the misinformation outbreak threshold λc. Figure 3 shows λc versus µ in which λc
increases linearly with µ. The theoretical predictions of λc obtained from Eq. (11) agree with the
stochastic simulations.
Figure 4 shows misinformation spreading in real-world temporal networks. As in Fig. 2, R
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FIG. 3. The outbreak threshold λc versus µ. The symbols represent the stochastic simulation threshold, and
line is the theoretical prediction.
increases with λ and decreases with µ. As in SIR epidemic spreading [59], the effective outbreak
threshold (λ/µ)c is a constant value. In addition, when the value aggregating window w is small,
there are fewer opportunities for spreaders to transmit the misinformation to stifler neighbors, thus
the misinformation does not break out globally, i.e., there are smaller values of R for smaller w.
Once again our theoretical results agree with the numerical simulations.
We next examine the performances of our proposed strategies for mitigating misinformation
spreading on artificial and real-world temporal networks. Figure 5 shows R versus λ for different
values of the fraction of containing nodes f . Note that R decreases with f because no more nodes
receive the misinformation. Note also that the TC strategy performs much better than the RC
strategy because the higher degree nodes 〈k〉 are contained, and spreaders can no longer transmit
the misinformation to stiflers. Thus when we immunize the same fraction of containing nodes, the
values of R for the TC strategy are smaller than those for the RC strategy. For example, when
f = 0.5, using the RC strategy≈ 30% of the nodes are informed by the misinformation, but using
the TC strategy none are informed by the misinformation. In addition, the outbreak threshold λc
12
0 0.1 0.2
0
0.5
1
R
 
 
0 0.1 0.2
0
0.5
1
0 0.1 0.2
0
0.5
1
λ
R
0 0.1 0.2
0
0.5
1
λ
µ=0.2
µ=0.5
µ=0.8
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
FIG. 4. Misinformation spreading on real-world temporal networks. The final misinformation outbreak
size R versus λ on ACM Hypertex conference data set with aggregating window (a) w = 30 min, (b)
w = 60 min, (c) w = 120 min and (d) w = 240 min. The symbols are the numerical simulation results,
and lines are the theoretical predictions.
decreases with f . Figures 5(c)–5(d) show the numerical predictions for λc.
Figure 6 shows that the HC strategy performs better than the TC strategy. We set To this end, we
set λ = 0.2 and 0.3 in 6(a) and 6(b), respectively, and compare the final misinformation spreading
size R with f . We find that the misinformation spreading dynamics are suppressed when we
use the HC strategy. For example, when f = 0.3 and λ = 0.3, few nodes are informed by the
misinformation, i.e., R ≈ 0.01 when we use the HC strategy, but when we use the TC strategy
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FIG. 5. Containing misinformation spreading dynamics on activity-driven temporal networks. The final
misinformation outbreak size R (a) and variability χ (c) versus the transmission probability λ under the
RC strategy. R (b) and χ (d) versus λ under the TC strategy. In (a) and (b), the lines are the theoretical
predictions, and symbols are the numerical simulation results.
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FIG. 6. Effectiveness of TC and HC strategies on activity-driven networks. The final misinformation
outbreak size R versus f for a given values of λ = 0.2 (a) and λ = 0.3 (b). The lines and symbols are the
theoretical and the numerical predictions of R, respectively.
to contain the misinformation the fraction of nodes informed by the misinformation is finite, i.e.,
R ≈ 0.25. Our theoretical results agree with the numerical simulation results.
An effective containing strategy with a fraction of immunized node f and a small outbreak
threshold λc greatly decreases the final misinformation outbreak size R. Figure 7 shows the ef-
fective outbreak threshold (λ/µ)c versus f on activity-driven networks for the RC, TC, and HC
strategies. Here (λ/µ)c increases with f , and (λ/µ)c is the largest using the HC strategy when f
is fixed. When f is sufficiently large, no λ value can induce a global misinformation outbreak.
We denote fc the critical probability that at least a fraction of fc nodes must be containing to halt
misinformation speading in temporal networks. We find that the values of fc for the HC containing
strategy are the smallest of all containing strategies. The fc value for the RC strategy is 5 times
the fc value for the TC strategy, and the fc value for the TC strategy is 2.5 times the fc value for
15
FIG. 7. The effective outbreak threshold (λ/µ)c versus the fraction of containing nodes f on activity-driven
networks for RC strategy (a), TC strategy (b), HC strategy (c) and the comparision of the three strategies (d).
The lines and symbols are the theoretical and numerical predictions of (λ/µ)c, respectively. The vertical
line represents the critical probability fc.
HC strategy. Thus the HC strategy is the most effective.
We finally examine real-world networks to varify the effectiveness of our proposed three strate-
gies. Figure 8 compares the performances of the TC and HC strategies by examining R versus f
for given values of λ. As in Fig. 6, the HC strategy most effectively contains the misinformation
spreading on temporal networks irrespective of the values of λ. In addition, Fig. 9 shows that the
effective outbreak threshold (λ/µ)c is the smallest when using the HC strategy. Thus our theory
accurately predicts the numerical simulation results.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have systematically examined the dynamics of misinformation spreading on temporal net-
works. We use activity driven networks to describe temporal networks, and use a discrete Marko-
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FIG. 8. Effectiveness of TC and HC strategies on ACM Hypertex conference data set. R versus f with
aggregating window (a) w = 30 min, (c) w = 60 min, (e) w = 120 min and (g) w = 240 min for λ = 0.2.
R versus f with (b) w = 30 min, (d) w = 60 min, (f) w = 120 min and (h) w = 240 min for λ = 0.3.
The lines and symbols are the theoretical and numerical predictions of R, respectively.
vian chain to describe the spreading dynamics. We find that the global misinformation outbreak
threshold correlates with the topology of temporal networks. Using extensive numerical simula-
tions, we find that our theoretical predictions agree with numerical predictions in both artificial
and real-world networks.
To contain misinformation spreading on temporal networks, we propose three strategies, ran-
dom containing (RC), targeted containing (TC), and heuristic containing (HC) strategies. We
perform numerical simulations and a theoretical analysis on both artificial and four real-world net-
works and find that the HC strategy outperforms the other two strategies, maximizes the outbreak
17
FIG. 9. Comparing the effectiveness of RC, TC and HC strategies on ACM Hypertex conference data set
with aggregating window (a) w = 30 min, (b) w = 60 min, (c) w = 120 min and (d) w = 240 min. The
lines and symbols are the theoretical and numerical predictions of (λ/µ)c, respectively.
threshold, and minimizes the final outbreak size. Our proposed containing strategy expands our
understanding of how to contain public sentiment and maintain social stability.
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